In this paper cores and stable sets for games with fuzzy coalitions are introduced and their relations studied. For convex fuzzy games it turns out that all cores coincide and that the core is the unique stable set. Also relations between cores and stable sets for fuzzy clan games are discussed.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study cores and stable sets for fuzzy games. In Section 2, we review definitions of the core, the dominance core, and the stable set (von 
Cores and stable sets for crisp games
Let N G w ∈ and let ) (w I be the imputation set of w , i.e.
Here we denote by N R the n-dimensional Euclidean space. The core ) (w C of a crisp game w is the subset of imputations which are stable against any possible deviation by a coalition, i.e.
The two conditions are interpreted as follows. Let
x is reachable by the coalition S . 
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A stable set of a crisp game w is a nonempty set K of imputations satisfying the properties:
We briefly recall some well-known facts for a crisp game w , which are interesting for our paper:
(1) The core ) (w C is a subset of the D-core ) (w DC , and both sets are convex sets (Gillies(1953) ).
, for each N S ⊆ (Shapley and Shubik (1969), Rafels and Tijs (1997) , Chang (2000) ).
(3) Each stable set contains the D-core ) (w DC .
(4) For each convex crisp game w there is only one stable set, which coincides with the D-core
(this is a consequence of (2) and the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (Bondareva (1963) , Shapley (1967) ).
For details we refer the reader to the books of Driessen (1988) , Owen (1995) , and Tijs (2003).
Cores and stable sets for fuzzy games
Let N FG v ∈ and let ) (v I be the imputation set of v , i.e.
The core (Aubin (1974) ) ) (v C of a fuzzy game v is the subset of imputations which are stable against any possible deviation by fuzzy coalitions, i.e.
Now we introduce two other cores for a fuzzy game v , namely the proper core and the crisp core, by weakening the stability conditions.
. From now on we use the notation
. The set of proper fuzzy coalitions is denoted by N PF . To define the proper core ) (v C P of a fuzzy game v , we consider only stability regarding proper fuzzy coalitions, i.e.
Further, if we consider only crisp-like coalitions S e in the stability conditions, one obtains the
Note that the crisp core ) (v C cr of a fuzzy game v is also the core of the crisp game ) (v cr w = .
One can easily see that both cores
is reachable by the fuzzy coalition s .
Remark 2. Note that
. It is, however, to be noted that The dominance core (D-core) ) (v DC of a fuzzy game v is the set of imputations which are not dominated by any other imputation, i.e.
A stable set of a fuzzy game v is a nonempty set K of imputations satisfying the properties:
Theorem 1. Let v be a fuzzy game. Then
Proof. The theorem is trivially true if
(i) This follows straightforwardly from the definitions.
(
consists of undominated imputations and each
is dominated by some imputation by the external stability property, it
In the next theorem we give sufficient conditions for the coincidence of the proper core and the dominance core.
Proof. Note that
. We show the converse inclusion by proving that
Q.E.D.
. Take the crisp game
, for each N S ⊆ . So Theorem 2 can be seen as an extension of property (2) for crisp games.
From Theorem 2 we obtain the following corollary.
and that there is a
. Thus there is no
We next prove that for a fuzzy game the dominance core is a convex set. 
Proof. Note that 
, where the first inequality 
v , and 2 v , the imputation set ∆ is the unique stable set.
. Hence, the sufficient condition in Theorem 2 for the equality
is not a necessary condition.
In the next example we give a fuzzy game v with
. For a crisp game w we have according to (5) 
is the unique stable set.
Cores and stable sets for convex fuzzy games
A special class of fuzzy games with a nonempty core is the class of convex fuzzy games introduced in Branzei et al.(2002) 
which is a contradiction with the individual rationality of y .
Theorem 4.
The dom relations for a convex fuzzy game v and its corresponding crisp game w coincide, i.e. for all
Proof. First we note that 
implies that s is a crisp-like coalition.
Suppose now that the assertion '
, and take
by Lemma 2. We note that s can be represented by a convex combination of 
The inequality
The following three cases should be considered: 
, implying that case (3) Q.E.D.
Theorem 5. Let v be a convex fuzzy game and
Proof. (ii) From Theorem 4 we conclude that
(iii) Since v is a convex fuzzy game we have
. We obtain by Theorem 2:
The next theorem extends the result of Shapley (1971) that each crisp convex game has a unique stable set coinciding with the dominance core. 
Cores and stable sets for fuzzy clan games
In this section games of the form
considered, where players in 1 N have participation levels which may vary between 0 and 1, while the players in 2 N are crisp players in the sense that they can fully cooperate or not at all. We
. We can define in an obvious way the proper core ) (v C P , the dominance core ) (v DC , the crisp core ) (v C cr and stable sets K . Then modifying the proofs in Theorems 1,2 and 3 we obtain
Special attention is given to a subclass of such games, which we have called fuzzy clan games In the following
is a fuzzy clan game with clan C if v satisfies the following three properties: Proof. 
